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CONFLICT OF LAWS
Robert A. Pascal*
LEx Loci DELICTI
By far the most important conflicts decision of recent years is
Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Company, I which overruled Johnson v. St.
Paul Mercury Insurance Co.2 In doing so, the supreme court placed
itself on the side of reason and among those who understand that the
law of the place of the wrong is not, as such, appropriately applicable
to determine what rights and obligations flow from that wrong to the
persons involved. In each of the above cases the question was that of
the liability of a Louisiana host-driver to his Louisiana guest resulting
from the host-driver's negligence in another state. Jagers decides that
Louisiana law, not the law of the place of the wrong, applies to deter-
mine that liability; or, to put it more correctly, Jagers should be
understood to declare that the jurisdiction to legislate on the liability
of the host to his guest belongs to the state of their common domicile,
the state of the political society to which they both belong.
The Jagers decision's broadest principle is a negative one, that
a state's being the place of the wrong is not sufficient reason to assign
legislative jurisdiction to that state to prescribe the resulting rights
and obligations of the parties involved. This is a principle of far-
reaching consequences for the conflict of laws in delict cases, for now
all the old applications of the rule lex loci delicti must be reexamined,
not simply those relating to host-driver and guest-passenger situa-
tions. The supreme court has indicated sufficiently clearly that it
regards the state of the common domicile of the parties as having
legislative jurisdiction. But what shall be said, for example, of a
collision in Louisiana between Texas and Florida domiciliaries?
Louisiana has no greater claim to legislative jurisdiction to determine
the rights of the parties against each other in such a case than Arkan-
sas or Mississippi had in Johnson or Jagers. The members of the
supreme court certainly were aware of the implications of their deci-
sion. They must be congratulated on having the strength of character
to assume their share of the responsibility for discovering the reasona-
ble bases of delineating legislative competence in delict cases, or
rewriting the rules of the conflict of laws in this area.
Joy over the Jagers decision notwithstanding, the writer cannot
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973). Other comments on Jagers appear in the Law in
General portion of this Symposium.
2. 256 La. 289, 236 So. 2d 216 (1970).
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avoid mentioning his disappointment over the majority opinion's ac-
ceptance of the Restatement Second's view of the conflict of laws as
a branch of state law.' It must be admitted that the Restatement
Second reproduces accurately the utterances of many, including
opinions of various justices of the United States Supreme Court, but
these utterances simply may not be accepted as correct. The full faith
and credit clause requires each state to give full faith and credit to
the laws of every other state. To give full faith and credit requires
applying the other state's law where the other state has legislative
jurisdiction. A state may not determine for itself its own or another
state's competence, for then the full faith and credit clause would be
not simply meaningless, but a source of bedlam. Legislative jurisdic-
tion, therefore, must be a matter of federal jurisdiction in implemen-
tation of the full faith and credit clause.' In every instance in which
the legislature or the judiciary of a state specifies a conflicts rule, it
must be envisioned as simply attempting to formulate a judgment as
to what the Congress or the federal courts would say it to be.
RES JUDICATA AND JUDICIAL SYMPATHY
No doubt hard cases often make for poor decisions, for justices,
being human, sometimes allow their sympathies to interfere with a
strict application of the law. In such instances justice contra legem
may be done to the parties, but there will be serious harm to the
principle of justice through law. Possibly McNeal v. State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Co.5 is such a case, for the majority opin-
ion's reasoning scarcely conceals what must have been the motivation
for the decision.
The facts are sufficient grist for a legal soap opera. A husband
said to have been a Louisiana domiciliary, while driving through
Mississippi, allegedly negligently caused his death and injury to his
wife and child. The widow and child sued in Louisiana in 1969, pre-
sumably relying on Louisiana court of appeal decisions applying the
law of the state of the domicile of the parties, rather than the lex loci
delicti. Before judgment, however, the Louisiana supreme court
handed down its decision in Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance
Co.,' which disallowed any abandonment of the lex loci delicti. The
widow and child then filed suit in Mississippi against both the hus-
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 (1971); 276 So. 2d at 311.
4. See the writer's remarks in previous Symposia: 33 LA. L. REv. 276, 278 (1973);
32 LA. L. REv. 295, 296-97 (1972); 31 LA. L. REv. 312, 314 (1971).
5. 278 So. 2d 108 (La. 1973).
6. 256 La. 289, 236 So. 2d 216 (1970).
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band's Mississippi executor and the liability insurer. The Mississippi
court dismissed the suit against the insurer because Mississippi law
does not authorize direct actions, and it dismissed the suit against
the husband's executor on the ground that the wife and child "had
no standing to maintain a suit in tort against the husband and father,
if living, or his estate, if deceased, in the courts of Mississippi. 7 The
insurer then filed an exception of res judicata in the Louisiana suit.
The trial court maintained the exception and the court of appeal
affirmed, relying largely on Johnson's insistence that Mississippi law
be applied to determine the rights of the parties. Before decision on
review, however, the supreme court rendered its decision in Jagers,
overruling Johnson. The majority, then, overruled the exception of
res judicata, construing the Mississippi court's dismissals of suit
against the insurer and the husband's executor to be both in the
nature of non-suit and not on the merits. Justice Dixon concurred.
Justice Summers dissented.
One may agree with the majority that the Mississippi judgment
dismissing the suit against the insurer was not itself a judgment on
the merits, for under Mississippi law an insurer may not be sued until
the insured is found liable. But one must agree with Justice Summers
that the Mississippi court's dismissal of the suit against the hus-
band's executor was on the merits, denying the existence of a cause
of action on which the husband and (after judgment against him) his
insurer could be held liable. Justice Dixon explicitly, and the major-
ity implicitly,9 held this Mississippi judgment to be one merely deny-
ing the existence of a cause of action under Mississippi law and not
denying the existence of a cause of action elsewhere-in effect a dis-
missal as of non-suit in Mississippi. The construction is strained, for
the Mississippi court would have to be understood to have dismissed
the suit on the ground forum non conveniens, a hardly credible
ground for dismissal of a contested suit based on events which had
occurred in Mississippi. No doubt the Louisiana supreme court sym-
pathized with the plaintiffs, believing it unjust for the insurer to
escape liability if the deceased and his family were Louisiana domici-
liaries at the time of the wrong, and perhaps wondering whether their
decision in Johnson had not contributed to the plaintiffs' difficulties.
Be that as it may, the plaintiffs had had their day in court. A decision
on the merits, once final, must stand, even if incorrect, or there will
be no end to litigation.
7. 278 So. 2d at 109.
8. Jagers v. Royal Ind. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973).
9. The majority opinion does not appear to have expressed its reasoning on this
aspect of the Mississippi judgment.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The last observation leads to a consideration of what the writer
believes to be the real tragedy in McNeal. Given the proper record,
the Mississippi judgment against the husband's executor could have
been appealed to the United States Supreme Court because of Mis-
sissippi's failure to apply Louisiana domestic law to the issue of the
existence of a cause of action. If, as the Louisiana supreme court has
come to realize in Jagers, it is the state of the domicile of the parties
which properly has legislative jurisdiction to determine whether a
wrong gives rise to a cause and a right of action, then Mississippi was
obliged under the full faith and credit clause to apply Louisiana law
to the case. A federal constitutional issue was involved. The United
States Supreme Court, it is true, yet speaks of the conflict of laws as
a branch of state law. The application of this view of the subject in
federal diversity cases is proof enough. But, on the other hand, every
United States Supreme Court decision on the "applicable" state law
is testimony to the failure of that court to be consistent in the matter.
McNeal at least would have provided a magnificent opportunity to
call upon the United States Supreme Court to pronounce authorita-
tively on the question.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The First Circuit Court of Appeal decided Griffin v. Universal
Underwriters Insurance Co. "' consistently with the United States
Supreme Court's 1943 decision in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,"
but before these remarks were written, the Louisiana supreme court
already had reversed the appellate decision on the basis of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Industrial Commission of Wis-
consin v. McCartin.2 The decision is important practically and theo-
retically. Practically, unless overruled, Griffin will allow one em-
ployed outside Louisiana, but injured here, who has already re-
covered workmen's compensation benefits in the state of employ-
ment, the right to recover such additional compensation, and such
damages against persons other than his employer, as Louisiana law
will allow. Theoretically the decision is important because it raises
anew the questions of the legislative jurisdiction of states in work-
men's compensation cases.
Magnolia had insisted that both the state of employment and the
state of injury had legislative jurisdiction on the subject, but that the
final acceptance of an award under one or the other state's laws would
10. 268 So. 2d 702 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
11. 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
12. 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
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be res judicata as to the employee, barring him from further recovery
in the second state. But, the supreme court argued, McCartin modi-
fied Magnolia by allowing additional recovery in the state of injury
if the legislation of the state of employment did not exclude recovery
in the state of injury. Indeed, not only does McCartin appear to say
just that, but it is possible to affirm without hesitation that no state
may limit another state's legislative competence. 3
The serious theoretical question, however, is whether there may
ever be two states competent to legislate for the same aspect of the
same situation. The writer doubts this legitimately can be so. Plural
judicial jurisdiction over the same persons in the same controversy
easily is understood; but plural legislative jurisdiction is, to say the
least, a troublesome notion. This does not mean the writer is ready
to pronounce ex cathedra academica on the thorny question. Perhaps
its very thorniness is what has given us the United States Supreme
Court decisions we have on the subject. But it is something to which
the art of law will have to give more attention.
DIVORCE JURISDICrION AND DOMICILE
In Williams v. North Carolina I,"4 the United States Supreme
Court decided that the state of the plaintiff's domicile had both legis-
lative and judicial jurisdiction to determine his right to a divorce.
Williams v. North Carolina I' 5 affirmed the right of a state, claiming
to be that of an individual's true domicile as of the time he obtained
an ex parte divorce in another state, to determine whether he truly
had been domiciled in that other state at the time of suit. Both
decisions assumed the employment of the usual or traditional notion
of interstate domicile with one exception: Williams II declared that
non-fault could not be a condition of a wife's change of interstate
domicile. Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in Granville-Smith
v. Granville-Smith,"6 though not to be taken to have so decided, at
least must be taken to indicate a Supreme Court sentiment that a
state is not entitled, through legislative or judicial action, either (1)
to eliminate domicile as the criterion of divorce jurisdiction, or (2) to
redefine domicile in order to enlarge its divorce jurisdiction beyond
that which it would have under the traditional notion of domicile, or
(3) to accomplish the same purpose indirectly through the establish-
13. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955), which also might have been cited
by the Louisiana supreme court in support of its position.
14. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
15. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
16. 349 U.S. 1 (1955).
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ment of presumptions of domicile not reasonably indicative of domi-
cile in fact. Even without the decision in Granville-Smith, however,
it would be most unreasonable to believe a state could redefine domi-
cile for itself either directly or indirectly. Being a criterion of inter-
state legislative competence for the purpose of applying the full faith
and credit clause, it is necessarily within the province of the federal
authority only to define it. Congress has not defined the concept, but
the Supreme Court has always accepted the usual or traditional no-
tion of domicile, and this notion has always included physical pres-
ence in a state with the intention of making that state the center of
one's life.
A state statute defining domicile as residence within the state for
three months or more may not reasonbly be taken to define domicile
in the traditional manner or to establish a presumption reasonably
indicative of the fact of domicile. Yet Arkansas enacted just such a
statute7 and the Arkansas supreme court has declared it constitu-
tional." The United States Supreme Court has not passed on its
validity, but one can say without hesitation that the statute does not
conform to the notions of domicile accepted in Williams through
Granville-Smith. In spite of this, however, Louisiana has given full
faith and credit to ex parte Arkansas divorce judgments in cases in
which the requirements of the Arkansas statute on domicile were
met, but in which the essentials of domicile as understood tradition-
ally certainly were not present. 9
The latest decision in this line is Hampson v. Hampson.2' The
plaintiff did rent a room in an Arkansas town close to the Louisiana
border, and he did spend most nights there for a period of three
months. At the same time his life in nearby Shreveport and Minden,
Louisiana, otherwise continued as before. As soon as three months
had expired he sued for and obtained a divorce in Arkansas, and as
soon as the judgment was rendered he abandoned his Arkansas
rented room and moved back to Shreveport. The Louisiana court of
appeal reasoned that the United States Supreme Court had neither
defined domicile nor forbidden a state to define it, declared itself
obliged therefore to give full faith and credit to the Arkansas statute
and through it to the Arkansas judgment of divorce. The writer sub-
mits that Hampson and similar decisions represent patent failures to
17. ARK. STAT. § 34-1208 (1947), as amended by Ark. Acts 1957, No. 36; 1961, No.
146; § 34-1208.1 (1947), as amended by Ark. Acts 1957, No. 36.
18. Wheat v. Wheat, 229 Ark. 842, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958).
19. Staples v. Staples, 232 So. 2d 904 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); Reeves v. Reeves,
209 So. 2d 554 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
20. 271 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
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adhere to the United States Supreme Court's decisions on the subject
reasonably construed and constitute open invitations to Louisiana
citizens to evade Louisiana's already extremely liberal divorce laws.
Such decisions cannot merit respect and can only increase popular
distrust of the law and its administration.
ADJUDICATION OF TITLE TO LAND IN ANOTHER STATE
Yawn v. Lamb2 declared divorced spouses owners of undivided
one-half interests each in land acquired by the husband in Missis-
sippi during marriage and presumably under circumstances in which
the land would have been a community asset if situated in Louisiana.
It is very unusual for the judiciary of one state to adjudicate interests
in land in another state and certainly full faith and credit need not
be given such adjudications. 22 It would have been safer for the court
to order the husband to transfer a one-half interest to his wife, for
Mississippi would have been obliged to give full faith and credit to
such a judgment. 23
21. 276 So. 2d 872 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
22. Fall v. Ea tin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909) is the principal case.
23. Id.
